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The Vagaries of Rule 103(b)
Robert G. Johnston* and lain D. Johnston**
I. INTRODUCTION
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) allows a court to dismiss an
action for a plaintiff's failure to use reasonable diligence to obtain
service of process.' The rule helps prevent delays and circumven-
tion of the applicable statute of limitations.2 A plaintiff bears the
burden of showing reasonable diligence in effecting service.3 The
test of reasonable diligence is an objective test measured by the
totality of circumstances, traditionally tested by six factors.4 The
defendant need not suffer any prejudice by the lack of diligence,-
and, under certain circumstances, the defendant can waive the de-
fense.6 Whether the dismissal under Rule 103(b) is with or without
prejudice depends on whether the failure to obtain service of pro-
cess occurred before or after the expiration of the statute of
limitations.7
Rule 103(b) has a troubled history of application both when
used in isolation and when used in conjunction with other provi-
sions of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure. In particular, Rule
103(b) has had a problematic interplay with sections 2-10098 and
* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, The John Marshall
Law School; J.D., 1960, University of Chicago Law School.
** Clerk to the Honorable Philip Reinhard, Illinois Appellate Court Justice, Second
District; J.D., cum laude, 1990, The John Marshall Law School.
1. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 103(b) (1989).
2. Greenwood v. Blondell, 85 Ill. App. 3d 186, 406 N.E.2d 204 (1st Dist. 1980). See
infra note 18 and accompanying text.
3. Dawson v. St. Francis Hosp., 174 Ill. App. 3d 351, 528 N.E.2d 362 (1st Dist. 1988)
(placing the burden of proof on the plaintiff). See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
4. Hanna v. Kelly, 91 Ill. App. 3d 896, 414 N.E.2d 1262 (1st Dist. 1980) (identifying
the six factors measuring the test of reasonable diligence). See infra notes 25-27 and
accompanying text.
5. Kappel v. Errera, 164 Ill. App. 3d 673, 674, 518 N.E.2d 226, 227 (1st Dist. 1987).
See infra note 28 and accompanying text.
6. Daily v. Hartley, 77 Ill. App. 3d 697, 704, 396 N.E.2d 586, 591 (3d Dist. 1979)
("It is only where it is obvious that defendant's participation and utilization of available
pre-trial discovery procedures are in anticipation of a defense on the merits that . . .
waiver.., should be applied.") See text accompanying notes 72-89.
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 103(b) (1989). Rule 103(b) allows for dismissal
with prejudice only after the expiration of the statute of limitations. Id. See infra note
112 and accompanying text.
8. ILL. Rnv. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1989). Section 2-1009 allows a plaintiff to
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13-217, which allow a plaintiff to dismiss a complaint voluntarily
and then to refile the claim. The Illinois Supreme Court has evalu-
ated the use and application of Rule 103(b) in light of these two
sections four times in as many years. 10
In order to develop a greater understanding of Rule 103(b) and
its interaction with the rules governing voluntary dismissals and
refiings, this Article begins with a general discussion of Rule
103(b) and the standard used in determining a Rule 103(b) mo-
tion.11 Part III analyzes the interplay between Rule 103(b) and
sections 2-1009 and 13-217 of the Illinois Code of Civil Proce-
dure.12 Part IV concludes with a discussion of the impropriety of
giving retroactive application to the rule of O'Connell v. St. Francis
Hospital.'3
II. ILLINOIS SUPREME COURT RULE 103(B)
A. In General
Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) states,
If the plaintiff fails to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain ser-
vice prior to the expiration of the applicable statute of limita-
tions, the action as a whole or as to any unserved defendant may
be dismissed without prejudice. If the failure to exercise reason-
able diligence to obtain service occurs after the expiration of the
applicable statute of limitations, the dismissal shall be with preju-
dice. In either case the dismissal may be made on the application
of any defendant or on the court's own motion.14
The purpose of Rule 103(b) is to protect defendants from unneces-
dismiss its claim voluntarily prior to a trial or hearing or the filing of a counterclaim. Id
See infra note 133 and accompanying text.
9. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 13-217 (1989). Section 13-217 allows a plaintiff to
refile an action that has been voluntarily dismissed or dismissed for want of prosecution
within the statute of limitations' remainder or one year, whichever is greater. Id. See
infra notes 133-37 and accompanying text.
10. See Martinez v. Erickson, 127 IH. 2d 112, 535 N.E.2d 853 (1989) (remanding for
further consideration of plaintiff's diligence in obtaining service of summons on refiling);
O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 112 Il. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986) (if a Rule 103(b)
motion is made before a plaintiff's motion to voluntarily dismiss, the Rule 103(b) motion
will be heard on the merits prior to consideration of plaintiff's motion to dismiss volunta-
rily). See also Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988) (holding that
O'Connell was to be applied retroactively); Catlett v. Novak, 116 Ill. 2d 63, 506 N.E.2d
586 (1987) (reafflirming O'Connell, 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322). For a complete
discussion of the aforementioned cases, see infra notes 148-90 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 14-132 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 133-190 and accompanying text.
13. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986). See infra notes 191-212 and accompany-
ing text.
14. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 103(b) (1989).
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sary 5 or intentional1 6 delays and stale claims, 17 to prevent the cir-
cumvention of the statute of limitations,"' and to promote
expeditious handling of suits. 19 Although the purposes of Rule
103(b) are valid, courts have warned that it should be applied with
judicial restraint,20 that it should not be used to dispose conve-
niently of litigation,21 and that it should not be used as a device to
reduce a backlog of cases.22
B. Standard
Once the defense of lack of diligence has been raised, either by
the defendant or the court, 23 the plaintiff bears the burden of prov-
ing that it exercised reasonable diligence in effecting service of pro-
cess.24  The test of reasonable diligence is an objective test 25
15. Hanna v. Kelley, 91 111. App. 3d 896, 900, 414 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 (1st Dist.
1980). In Hanna, the appellate court affirmed a dismissal when the plaintiff's only efforts
included moving for a stay of discovery until all the parties appeared and serving inter-
rogatories. Id. at 899, 414 N.E.2d at 1264.
16. Margetich v. McCarrol, 97 Ill. App. 3d 502, 423 N.E.2d 266 (3rd Dist. 1981). In
Margetich, the court held that Rule 103(b) is a jurisdictional limitation. Id. at 504, 423
N.E.2d at 267. The court therefore applied Rule 103(b) to this paternity action in which
twenty-seven months passed between the service and the filing of the complaint, and there
was no evidence to show that the delay was reasonable. Id.
17. Meyer v. Wardrop, 37 Ill. App. 3d 243, 345 N.E.2d 762 (1st Dist. 1976). In
Meyer, the appellate court affirmed dismissal for lack of reasonable diligence, when de-
spite the listing of defendant's residence and business in a local directory, service was not
obtained until four years after the cause of action. Id. at 247-48, 345 N.E.2d at 766.
18. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-201(a) (1990) provides that an action is com-
menced by filing. If an action is filed even one day before the statute of limitations runs,
it is timely. Rule 103(b) requires reasonable diligence in obtaining service of process so as
not to unduly delay notice to the defendant that an action was filed. See Wallace v.
Smith, 75 Ill. App. 3d 739, 394 N.E.2d 665 (1st Dist. 1979) (affirming a dismissal when
there was no attempt to serve a defendant-agent for two and a half years after the com-
plaint was filed, and the plaintiff knew the defendant's location); Faust v. Michael Reese
Hosp., 61111. App. 3d 233, 377 N.E.2d 1040 (1st Dist. 1978). But see Aranda v. Hobart
Mfg. Corp., 66 Ill. 2d 616, 363 N.E.2d 796 (1977) (Dooley, J., concurring) (diligence is
immaterial to actions refiled under section 24 (current section 13-217)).
19. Margetich, 97 Ill. App. 3d at 504, 423 N.E.2d at 267.
20. Wallace, 75 Ill. App. 3d at 743, 394 N.E.2d at 668.
21. Aranda, 66 Ill. 2d 616, 363 N.E.2d 796 (Dooley, J., concurring). See infra notes
138-47 and accompanying text.
22. Galvan v. Morales, 9 Ill. App. 3d 255, 258-59, 292 N.E.2d 36, 38-39 (1st Dist.
1972) ("Rule 103(b) is not used merely as a device to reduce the backlog of cases, but
consideration of the competing factors inherent in ruling on a Rule 103(b) motion should
be given to each case in which such a motion arises.").
23. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para, 103(b) (1989).
24. Kappel v. Errera, 164 Ill. App. 3d 673, 679, 518 N.E.2d 226, 230 (1st Dist. 1987)
("It is plaintiff's burden to show that he has exercised reasonable diligence to obtain
service of process on a defendant."); Gatto v. Nelson, 142 Ill. App. 3d 284, 287, 492
N.E.2d 1, 4 (1st Dist. 1986) ("The burden is on the plaintiff to show that he has exercised
reasonable diligence to obtain service."); Montero v. University of Ill. Hosp., 57 Ill. App.
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measured by the totality of the circumstances.2 6 Under the totality
of the circumstances standard, courts have considered several fac-
tors when determining whether the plaintiff used reasonable dili-
gence in obtaining service after the statute of limitations expired.
The six factors are (1) the length of time used to obtain service of
process; (2) the activities of the plaintiff; (3) any knowledge on the
part of the plaintiff of the defendant's location; (4) the ease with
which the defendant's whereabouts could have been ascertained;
(5) the actual knowledge by the defendant of the pendency of the
action as the result of ineffective service; and (6) special circum-
stances which would affect the efforts made by the plaintiff.27 Prej-
udice to the defendant is not included among the factors
considered in determining reasonable diligence. The courts have
consistently held that the defendant need not show prejudice re-
sulting from a plaintiff's lack of reasonable diligence in obtaining
28service.
3d 206, 210, 372 N.E.2d 1010, 1013 (Ist Dist. 1978) ("The burden was clearly on
plaintiff.").
25. Dawson v. St. Francis Hosp., 174 111. App. 3d 351, 356, 528 N.E.2d 362, 366 (Ist
Dist. 1988) ("The determination of what constitutes reasonable diligence under Supreme
Court Rule 103(b) has been addressed by the courts, who [sic] use an objective stan-
dard."); Semersky v. West, 166 II. App. 3d 637, 642, 520 N.E.2d 71, 74 (2d Dist. 1988)
("The standard for determining whether reasonable diligence has been exercised is an
objective one."); North Cicero Dodge v. Victoria Feed Co., 151111. App. 3d 860, 863, 503
N.E.2d 868, 870 (3d Dist. 1987) ("The standard for determining reasonable diligence is
an objective one.").
26. Martinez v. Erickson, 127 Ill. 2d 112, 122, 535 N.E.2d 853, 858 (1989) ("The
determination of diligence must be made in light of the totality of the circumstances.");
Penrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 125, 129, 501 N.E.2d 367, 369 (4th
Dist. 1986) ("Rule 103(b) is not based upon the subjective test of the plaintiff's intent but
rather upon the objective test of reasonable diligence in effecting service."); Faust v.
Michael Reese Hosp., 61 11. App. 3d 233, 236, 377 N.E.2d 1040, 1043 (Ist Dist. 1978)
("Each case must be judged and evaluated on its own facts and circumstances."); Mon-
tero, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 372 N.E.2d at 1013 ("Each case will be decided on its own
particular facts and circumstances."); Alsobrook v. Cote, 133 II. App. 2d 261, 264, 273
N.E.2d 270, 272 (Ist Dist. 1971) ("There is no fixed rule or absolute standard which can
be universally applied to determine whether a plaintiff has exercised reasonable diligence
to obtain service; each case, of necessity, must be judged and evaluated on its own pecu-
liar facts and circumstances.").
27. Segal v. Sacco, 175 Ill. App. 3d 504, 506, 529 N.E.2d 1038, 1039 (1st Dist. 1988);
Daily v. Hartley, 77 Ill. App. 3d 697, 701, 396 N.E.2d 586, 589 (3d Dist. 1979); Al-
sobrook, 133 Ill. App. 2d at 264, 273 N.E.2d at 272.
28. Kappel, 164 111. App. 3d at 679, 518 N.E.2d at 230 ("defendant... has no obliga-
tion to establish that he has been prejudiced by the delay of service"); Gatto, 142 Ill. App.
3d at 287, 492 N.E.2d at 4 ("defendant need not establish that he has been prejudiced by
the delay"); Montero, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 210, 372 N.E.2d at 1013 ("[d]efendants were
under no obligation to show that they had been prejudiced by the complained of delays in
service of process").
The Vagaries of Rule 103(b)
1. Time
While the length of time used to obtain service is an important
factor in determining reasonable diligence, "[R]ule 103(b)] does
not set a specific time limit within which a defendant must be
served. '29 The effect of the delay upon the reasonable diligence
inquiry thus varies with the facts of each case. For example, in
Kappel v. Errera,30 in which seven years passed between the initial
filing of the action and the service of process, the court stated,
"[c]learly, absent a satisfactory explanation, the delay in effectuat-
ing service of process... was unreasonable."'" In comparison, in
Galvan v. Morales,32 a delay of less than thirteen months was not
found unreasonable.33 The Galvan court stated that, "[g]iven the
period of time in which service was obtained, in light of the statute
of limitations and plaintiff's activities in attempting to locate and
serve the defendants, we think that the plaintiff exercised reason-
able diligence to obtain service on the defendants. 34
Although the temporal component of the totality of circum-
stances test involves no fixed standard or rule, the period of time
used to obtain service of process can be dispositive. In Segal v.
Sacco,35 for example, almost five months passed between the filing
and the service, and the plaintiff made no attempt to have process
served during that time. In ruling on the defendant's Rule 103(b)
motion, the court stated, "The first factor, length of time used to
obtain service of process, is determinative here."' 36 The court noted
that, "the time here was simply too short to permit dismissal with
prejudice of the entire action."37 Thus, despite the plaintiff's com-
plete lack of effort to obtain service during the five-month period,
the court held that the plaintiff had exercised reasonable diligence.
The holding in Segal is perplexing because under a totality of the
29. Jarmon v. Jinks, 165 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861, 520 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1st Dist. 1987)
(reasonable diligence was found when plaintiff made numerous efforts to locate the de-
fendant, although over three years passed between the filing and the service); Faust, 61
Ill. App. 3d at 236, 377 N.E.2d at 1042.
30. 164 Ill. App. 3d 673, 518 N.E.2d 226 (1st Dist. 1987).
31. Id. at 679, 518 N.E.2d at 231.
32. 9 Ill. App. 3d 255, 292 N.E.2d 36 (1st Dist. 1972).
33. Id. at 258, 292 N.E.2d at 38.
34. Id. In Galvan, a dram shop case, the plaintiff's efforts included searching records
of the Liquor Commission and tax records of the Cook County collector's office pertain-
ing to the property on which the tavern was located. Id. at 257, 292 N.E.2d at 37.
35. 175 Ill. App. 3d 504, 529 N.E.2d 1038 (1st Dist. 1988).
36. Id. at 506, 529 N.E.2d at 1040.
37. Id. Segal cites a long list of cases discussing the permissible and impermissible
length of time between the filing or running of the statute of limitations and the service of
process. Id. at 507-08, 529 N.E.2d at 1040.
1990]
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circumstances standard all the facts must be examined; thus, the
court should have considered the plaintiff's inactivity during the
five-month period as well as the other factors involved in the rea-
sonable diligence inquiry.38 The Segal court apparently disre-
garded these other factors and allowed the time factor to be
dispositive of the reasonable diligence issue.
2. Activities of the Plaintiff
Generally, to avoid a Rule 103(b) dismissal, the plaintiff must
have made some attempt to serve the defendant. 39 In those cases in
which the plaintiff has made a minimal attempt to serve the de-
fendant, however, the courts' analyses border on "Monday morn-
ing quarterbacking. '"40 The court essentially allows hindsight to
determine the reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts to serve the
defendant with process.
In Alsobrook v. Cote,41 an auto accident case, the court held that
the plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence, despite the plaintiff's
rather concerted efforts to serve process. The plaintiff took the fol-
lowing actions: (1) wrote to the Secretary of State, Auto Registra-
tion Division, to obtain the defendant's address; (2) checked with
the county clerk, marriage license division, to determine whether
the defendant had her name changed by marriage; (3) examined
area telephone directories; and (4) visited the defendant's last-
known address.42 The court held that these actions did not amount
to reasonable diligence because the plaintiff used a two-year-old
accident report to retrieve the address.43 Additionally, the court
noted that "for a period of almost two years, the inspection of four
1967 and four 1968 telephone directories was the only effort made
on behalf of the plaintiff to locate the defendant."'  Finding an
38. See supra text accompanying note 27 (six factors comprising the totality of cir-
cumstances test set forth).
39. Kruk v. Birk, 168 Ill. App. 3d 949, 957, 523 N.E.2d 93, 99 (1st Dist. 1988)
("Here the record is clear that the plaintiff made no attempt to serve any of the defend-
ants in the first action.").
40. Faust v. Michael Reese Hosp., 61 111. App. 3d 233, 237, 377 N.E.2d 1040, 1043-
44 (1st Dist. 1978) ("[A]lthough we realize hindsight is normally excellent, it is obvious
that even as a matter of foresight anyone diligently searching for a physician would be
expected to contact one of several medical societies...").
41. 133 Ill. App. 2d 261, 273 N.E.2d 270 (1st Dist. 1971).
42. Id. at 263, 273 N.E.2d at 271.
43. Id. at 265, 273 N.E.2d at 272.
44. Id. The court did recognize, however, that "there is no indication in the record of
where the defendant resided between December 1963 and June 1968.... [or] of whether
the defendant's address was readily available in the telephone directories or otherwise."
[Vol. 21
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absence of reasonable diligence, the court therefore affirmed the
trial court's dismissal under Rule 103(b).4 5
In Faust v. Michael Reese Hospital,46 a medical malpractice suit
against a defendant doctor and a codefendant hospital, the plain-
tiff's first service was quashed. The plaintiff then deposed the
codefendant hospital to acquire the defendant doctor's home ad-
dress. The hospital supplied the wrong street name, substituting
an "a" for an "i" in the street name "Bissell." ' "4 Following the
deposition, the plaintiff waited eleven months to serve the defend-
ant doctor at the address obtained. The letter was returned
marked, "Not deliverable." In granting the Rule 103(b) motion,
the court noted that the plaintiff's delay of almost one year in at-
tempting service at the incorrect address showed a lack of dili-
gence. 49 The court reasoned that although an attempted service at
the wrong address would have been ineffectual, it would have put
the plaintiff on notice that the address was wrong. 50 The plaintiff
then could have used other diligent methods to find the defend-
ant.5 ' The plaintiff's untimely service therefore evidenced a lack of
reasonable diligence.5 2
In Montero v. University of Illinois Hospital,5 3 the court held that
the plaintiff failed to use reasonable diligence in obtaining service
of process.54 In this medical malpractice case against the hospital
and several doctors, the plaintiff attempted to serve three alias
summonses; it made inquiries to the post office, the hospital where
the doctor worked and the American Medical Association; it also
published notice and checked the new telephone directory for each
year. 5 Despite these rather significant efforts to locate the individ-
ual defendants, the court held that the plaintiff did not exercise
reasonable diligence. 56 The court's conclusion was based on plain-
tiff's failure to use discovery procedures against the codefendant
hospital to gain information regarding the whereabouts of the indi-
45. Id.
46. 61 111. App. 3d 233, 377 N.E.2d 1040 (1st Dist. 1978).
47. Id. at 235, 377 N.E.2d at 1042.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 237, 377 N.E.2d at 1043.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 238, 377 N.E.2d at 1044.
52. Id.
53. 57 I1. App. 3d 206, 372 N.E.2d 1010 (1st Dist. 1978).
54. Id. at 210, 372 N.E.2d at 1013.
55. Id. at 208, 372 N.E.2d at 1012.
56. Id. at 210, 372 N.E.2d at 1013.
1990]
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vidual doctor defendants. 7
In contrast, in Licka v. William A. Sales, Ltd.,58 the court held
that the plaintiff, who also did not use discovery procedures to gain
information regarding the defendant's whereabouts, exercised rea-
sonable diligence to obtain service of process. 9 In this case, the
plaintiff searched telephone directories and contacted the Ameri-
can Medical Association. 6° The plaintiff later obtained service on
the defendant thirteen months after the first amended complaint
naming the hospital and doctor as codefendants was filed.6' De-
spite the thirteen-month delay and the failure to use discovery pro-
cedures to facilitate locating the defendant doctor, the court ruled
that the plaintiff exercised reasonable diligence. 62
As evidenced by the different weight placed on the importance of
using discovery procedures by the courts in Montero and Licka,
the totality of circumstances standard allows the court wide discre-
tion in determining whether the plaintiff's activities constituted
reasonable diligence. This broad range of discretion permits the
courts to focus on one or more factors while giving other factors
less weight. Although this discretion is necessary, it poses the risk
of allowing trial courts to dispose of litigation that may have sub-
stantive merit.
3. Knowledge of the Defendant's Location
Generally, if a plaintiff knows a defendant's location, yet fails to
obtain service within a reasonable period of time, the defendant's
motion for dismissal for lack of reasonable diligence will be
granted.63 In Penrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.," the plaintiff at-
tempted service of process with the filing of the complaint and at-
tached the name and address of the registered agent. The court
concluded that the plaintiff "conclusively showed that he knew
how to locate the defendant for service by setting forth the name
and address of the registered agent in his request for summons...
attached to the complaint. ' 65 The plaintiff, however, failed to ex-
57. Id.
58. 70 Ill. App. 3d 929, 937-38, 388 N.E.2d 1261, 1267-68 (1st Dist. 1979).
59. Id. at 938, 388 N.E.2d at 1268.
60. Id. at 931-32, 388 N.E.2d at 1263.
61. Id. at 932, 388 N.E.2d at 1263. The delay in service resulted from the existence of
two doctors with the same name. Id.
62. Id. at 938, 388 N.E.2d at 1268.
63. Penrod v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 150 Ill. App. 3d 125, 129, 501 N.E.2d 367, 369
(4th Dist. 1986).
64. Id. at 125, 501 N.E.2d at 367.
65. Id. at 129, 501 N.E.2d at 369.
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ercise due diligence in assuring that the summons was issued by the
clerk of the court and delivered to the sheriff for service.66 Conse-
quently, the court held that the plaintiff failed to exercise reason-
able diligence and affirmed the trial court's dismissal under Rule
103(b). 67
In contrast to Penrod, the plaintiff in Jarmon v. Jinks6 s "never
ascertained where [the defendant] resided" 69 despite substantial
and numerous efforts to locate the defendant. The plaintiff made
several inquiries to the United States Post Office and the Illinois
Secretary of State and also searched telephone directories. 70 The
court concluded because the plaintiff made several concerted, yet
unsuccessful, efforts to locate the defendant, the plaintiff used rea-
sonable diligence and affirmed denial of the defendant's Rule
103(b) motion.71
4. The Ease with Which Defendant's Location Could Have
Been Ascertained
The importance of the ease with which the plaintiff could have
located the defendant is exemplified in Daily v. Hartley.72 In Daily,
the plaintiff served the defendant eight years, seven months and
twenty-seven days after the cause of action arose and six years,
seven months, and twenty-eight days after the action was originally
filed. 73 Although the court could have simply used the six and a
half year delay to justify its finding of a lack of reasonable dili-
gence, the court instead focused on the ease factor.74
The plaintiff in Daily was involved in an automobile accident
with a fellow union pipefitter, Richard MacFarlane. 7 One day
before the statute of limitations would have run, the plaintiff filed
suit against MacFarlane, but the complaint referred to him as
"MacFarland." '7 6 The plaintiff made several attempts to locate the
66. Id. The plaintiff waited over four months after the complaint was initially filed to
inquire at the clerk's office whether a summons had ever been issued. Upon learning that
none had in fact been issued, the plaintiff waited an additional three months before mak-
ing a second request for a summons. Id. at 126, 501 N.E.2d at 367.
67. Id. at 129, 501 N.E.2d at 369.
68. 165 Ill. App. 3d 855, 520 N.E.2d 783 (1st Dist. 1987).
69. Id. at 861, 520 N.E.2d at 786.
70. Id. After unsuccessfully serving two alias summons, the plaintiff finally effected
service of the defendant through the Secretary of State. Id. at 858, 520 N.E.2d at 786.
71. Id. at 862, 520 N.E.2d at 787.
72. 77 Ill. App. 3d 697, 396 N.E.2d 586 (3d Dist. 1979).
73. Id. at 701, 396 N.E.2d at 589.
74. Id. at 701 396 N.E.2d at 589-90.
75. Id. at 698, 396 N.E.2d at 588.
76. Id.
1990]
Loyola University Law Journal
defendant, including inquiries to acquaintances and the union.""
Daily also searched area telephone directories. Daily's first attor-
ney checked with both the Illinois State Police and the Will
County Sheriff's Department, twice attempted to obtain the de-
fendant's address from the union, hired a private investigator and
examined area telephone directories. Daily's second attorney,
hired in 1975, five years after the filing, exerted similar efforts.7"
Finally, in 1976, Daily discovered that MacFarlane had been killed
in a snowmobile accident. 79 The plaintiff then filed a petition to
appoint the public administrator of Will County as administrator
of MacFarlane's estate and subsequently obtained service on the
administrator.8 0
Despite the substantial delay in effecting service, the court fo-
cused on the ease with which the defendant's location could have
been ascertained.8" The court stated that "[tihe plaintiff could
have easily discovered MacFarlane's real name and address by sub-
poenaing the records of the pipefitters union local."8 2 The court
also noted that the plaintiff could have obtained the accident report
from the state police.8 3 Because the plaintiff failed to utilize these
relatively simple means of discovering the defendant's location, the
court held that the plaintiff failed to exercise reasonable diligence.8 4
It is curious to note that despite the great amount of time betwen
filing and service, the court focused on the ease factor to justify its
dismissal pursuant to Rule 103(b). In so doing, the court suggests
that even an enormous amount of time between filing and service
will not be sufficient grounds for Rule 103(b) dismissal if reason-
able diligence to effect service during this period can be shown.
The court seemingly utilized the ease factor to find an absence of
reasonable diligence and to dismiss the plaintiff's claim. Daily
plainly demonstrates that, under the Rule 103(b) totality of cir-
77. Id. at 699, 396 N.E.2d at 588.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 701, 396 N.E.2d at 590.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
83. Id. The court stated that, "the ease with which Mrs. MacFarlane obtained the
report from the State Police makes it evident that plaintiff should have obtained the re-
port with equal ease." Id. (emphasis added). Yet, the court apparently overlooked that
the plaintiff "[had] checked with both the Illinois State Police and the Will County Sher-
iff's Department to ascertain if an accident report had been filed, and was informed that
none had." Id. at 699, 396 N.E.2d at 588. Thus, the plaintiff's efforts to obtain service of
process were arguably more reasonable than the court stated.
84. Id. at 701, 396 N.E.2d at 590.
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cumstances test, no one factor is determinative of a finding of rea-
sonable diligence; rather, all factors interact and affect one another.
5. Defendant's Actual Knowledge of the Action
Actual knowledge of the suit by the defendant is another factor
used to determine reasonable diligence under the totality of cir-
cumstances test. Although most courts tacitly recognize that
under this test each factor has to be weighed in determining
whether reasonable diligence was used, consideration of the actual
knowledge factor expressly recognizes the importance of the total-
ity of the circumstances. In Gatto v. Nelson,85 for example, the
court stated that, "a defendant's actual knowledge of the pendency
of the action is only one factor to be considered." 6 Likewise, in
Faust,"7 the court stated, "a defendant's actual knowledge of the
suit will not prevent a dismissal under Rule 103(b) when, under all
the circumstances, a trial court finds that a plaintiff has failed to
exercise reasonable diligence in effecting service.""' Thus, "even
assuming that the record contains evidence sufficient to establish
that [the defendant] possessed actual knowledge, such a factor is
not dispositive of the [due diligence] issue."'89
6. Special Circumstances
In determining reasonable diligence, the courts consider any spe-
cial circumstances, such as a divorce, remarriage or change of sur-
name, which would hinder a plaintiff's efforts to locate and serve a
defendant. 9° Another example of special circumstances occurred
in Daily v. Hartley, in which confusion existed as to the defendant's
name. The court stated that, "the confusion involving the defend-
ant's surname . . . certainly must be considered to be a 'special
circumstance' affecting plaintiff's efforts." '9  In North Cicero
Dodge v. Victoria Feed Co. ,92 however, the court ruled no special
circumstances existed, even though the sheriff had returned the
summons with a notation that "the [Victoria Feed Co.] was no
85. 142 Ill. App. 3d 284, 492 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1986).
86. Id. at 291, 492 N.E.2d at 6.
87. 61 111. App. 3d 233, 377 N.E.2d 1040 (1st Dist. 1978).
88. Id. at 238, 377 N.E.2d at 1044.
89. Kappel v. Errera, 164 111. App. 3d 673, 680, 518 N.E.2d 226, 231 (1st Dist. 1987).
90. Kusek v. Shamie, 11 111. App. 3d 722, 298 N.E.2d 343 (1st Dist. 1973) (dismissal
was reversed because the plaintiff made continuing efforts, including using a private in-
vestigator, to serve the defendant, who was divorced and remarried).
91. Daily v. Hartley, 77 Ill. App. 3d 697, 702, 396 N.E.2d 586, 590 (3d Dist. 1979).
92. 151 Ill. App. 3d 860, 503 N.E.2d 868 (3d Dist. 1987).
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longer in operation," when in fact the company still existed.93 The
court asserted that the error "was not a sufficient special circum-
stance to excuse the delay." 94 It, therefore, granted the Rule
103(b) motion, holding that the plaintiff had not exercised reason-
able diligence. 95 As evidenced by these cases, a finding of special
circumstances lies within the discretion of the trial court and con-
sequently varies with the facts of each case.96
C. Waiver
A defendant waives the right to a dismissal under Rule 103(b) by
actively participating in the defense of the action on its merits.97 A
plaintiff has the burden of establishing that the defendants waived
their rights to the defense of Rule 103(b). 9s Additionally, a plain-
tiff cannot argue for the first time on appeal that the defendant
waived a Rule 103(b) defense; it must be raised first at trial.9
Lovell v. Hastings 11 established the standard for determining
when a defendant waives a Rule 103(b) defense. Under Lovell, a
defendant waives the defense by participating in discovery.101 For
example, filing sworn answers to interrogatories or taking discov-
ery depositions of the plaintiff may result in waiver of a Rule
103(b) defense. 102 Participation in discovery for the purpose of dis-
covering if there are grounds for filing a motion to dismiss under
Rule 103(b), however, does not constitute a waiver. ° 3 Further, a
defendant must take part in discovery on its own behalf to consti-
tute a waiver; a co-defendant cannot waive a defendant's right to
93. Id. at 863, 503 N.E.2d at 870.
94. Id
95. Id
96. The Rule 103(b) motion's standard of review is abuse of discretion. Miller v.
Alexander, 150 Ill. App. 3d 594, 502 N.E.2d 40 (2d Dist. 1986). See infra note 121 and
accompanying text.
97. Gatto v. Nelson, 142 Ill. App. 3d 284, 292, 492 N.E.2d 1, 7 (1st Dist. 1986).
98. Montero v. University of Ill. Hosp., 57 Ill. App. 3d 206, 211, 372 N.E.2d 1010,
1014 (1st Dist. 1978).
99. Kruk v. Birk, 168 Ill. App. 3d 949, 958, 523 N.E.2d 93, 100 (1st Dist. 1988)
("Plaintiff argues that defendants waived their rights under Rule 103(b) by answering her
complaint and participating in discovery. The record reveals that this argument was not
made to the trial court; consequently it is not properly before this court.").
100. 11 111. App. 3d 221, 296 N.E.2d 608 (5th Dist. 1973).
101. Id. at 223, 296 N.E.2d at 609.
102. Id. at 223, 296 N.E.2d at 610. No Illinois Supreme Court case has discussed
waiver of a 103(b) motion. Subsequent cases have cited Lovell with approval and follow
it as the appropriate standard. See, e.g., Daily v. Hartley, 77 II. App. 3d 697, 703-04,
396 N.E.2d 586, 591 (3d Dist. 1979).
103. Daily, 77 Ill. App. 3d at 703-04, 396 N.E.2d at 591.
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raise a Rule 103(b) defense. 104 In sum, waiver occurs when a de-
fendant participates in discovery for purposes of raising a defense
on the merits.10 5
Currently, a division exists between the Illinois appellate dis-
tricts concerning the relevance of the plaintiff's actions to the issue
of waiver. In Montero, the first district distinguished the case at
bar from Lovell, stating that unlike the plaintiffs in Montero, the
Lovell plaintiffs "undertook considerable effort to serve the defend-
ant." 0 6 The court therefore concluded that the plaintiff failed to
establish that the defendants waived the Rule 103(b) defense. 107
In contrast to the position adopted by the first district, in Daily
v. Hartley the third district expressly denied the relevance of the
plaintiff's activities in determining the issue of waiver.108 The
Daily court stated that,
It seems to us that when the issue before the court is waiver by
the defendant, the particular activities of the plaintiff are irrele-
vant .... Whatever the plaintiff does . . . has no bearing in
deciding whether the defendant, by full and voluntary participa-
tion in the initial stages of the litigation, has waived objection to
defendant's lack of diligence under Rule 103(b)."
Thus, although the first district considers the plaintiff's efforts to
serve the defendant to be of some importance to the waiver issue,
the third district lends no weight to the plaintiff's activities.
D. Dismissal With or Without Prejudice
If a plaintiff's failure to exercise reasonable diligence in ob-
taining service of process occurs before the applicable statute of
limitations has run, Rule 103(b) provides that the court may dis-
miss the action without prejudice.110 Under such circumstances,
104. Montero, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 211, 372 N.E.2d at 1014.
105. See Semersky v. West, 166 Ill. App. 3d 637, 642, 520 N.E.2d 71, 74 (2d Dist.
1988).
106. Montero, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 211, 372 N.E.2d at 1014 (citation omitted). See also
Meyer v. Wardrop, 37 11. App. 3d 243, 247, 345 N.E.2d 762, 766 (1st Dist. 1976) (citing
Lovell v. Hastings, 11 Ill. App. 3d 221, 296 N.E.2d 608 (5th Dist. 1973) ("In Lovell, the
court observed that the 'plaintiffs undertook considerable effort in their attempt to serve
the defendant.' ")).
107. Montero, 57 Ill. App. 3d at 211, 372 N.E.2d at 1014. The determinative factor
in the court's no waiver holding was the plaintiff's failure to show that the defendants
either initiated or participated in discovery. Id. The level of the plaintiff's activities in
attempting to serve process was of secondary importance. Id.
108. Daily v. Hartley, 77 Ill. App. 3d 607, 703, 396 N.E.2d 586, 591 (3d Dist. 1979).
109. Id.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 11GA, para. 103(b) (1989).
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the court has no authority to dismiss the action with prejudice. 1
If. a plaintiff's failure to serve process occurs after the applicable
limitations period has run, then the dismissal shall be granted with
prejudice.112
E. Appeal and Review
Plaintiffs and defendants must use different Illinois Supreme
Court Rules in appealing the grant or denial of a Rule 103(b) mo-
tion. A plaintiff can appeal the grant of a Rule 103(b) motion with
prejudice through either Supreme Court Rule 301113 or 304.114
Rule 301 allows for appeals as of right for final judgments." 5 Rule
304 allows for an appeal of a final order as to a party or claim in a
case involving multiple parties or claims when the court finds that
there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal." 6 In
11. Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 66 Ill. 2d 616, 619, 363 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1977).
112. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l10A, para. 103(b) (1989). According to the Committee
Comments to Rule 103,
[plaragraph (b) was changed in the 1967 revision to provide that the dismissal
may be with prejudice, and was further revised in 1969 to provide that a dismis-
sal with prejudice shall be entered only when the failure to exercise due dili-
gence to obtain service occurred after the expiration of the applicable statute of
limitations. Prior to the expiration of the statute, a delay in service does not
prejudice a defendant.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 103(b) (Committee Comments) (Smith-Hurd 1985).
113. Rule 301 states,
Every final judgment of a circuit court in a civil case is appealable as of right.
The appeal is initiated by filing a notice of appeal. No other step is jurisdic-
tional. An appeal is a continuation of the proceeding. All rights that could have
been asserted by appeal or writ of error may be asserted by appeal. No formal
exception need be taken in order to make any ruling or action of the court
reviewable.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 301 (1989).
114. Rule 304(a) states in relevant part:
If multiple parties or multiple claims for relief are involved in an action, an
appeal may be taken from a final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all
of the parties or claims only if the trial court has made an express written find-
ing that there is no just reason for delaying enforcement or appeal. Such a
finding may be made at the time of the entry of the judgment or thereafter on
the court's own motion or on motion of any party .... [A]ny judgment that
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or the rights and liabilities of fewer than all
the parties is not enforceable or appealable and is subject to revision at any time
before the entry of a judgment adjudicating all the claims, rights and liabilities
of all the parties.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 304(a) (1989).
115. Id. para. 301.
116. Id para. 304. See also Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Kneller, 172 InI. App. 3d 210,
212-13, 525 N.E.2d 1155, 1157 (3d Dist. 1988) (citing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. l10A, para.
304(a) (1985)) ("Rule 304 specifically calls for a finding that there is no just reason for
delaying 'enforcement or appeal'%").
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contrast to the plaintiff's remedies, a defendant can appeal a denial
of a Rule 103(b) motion only through Supreme Court Rule 308.17
Rule 308, however, allows discretionary interlocutory appeals, and
it is construed strictly' " and used sparingly." 19 Appeals under this
rule are allowed only for exceptional cases.1 20
Because both grants and denials under Rule 103(b) lie within the
sound discretion of the trial court, such rulings will not be dis-
turbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion.' 2'
117. Rule 308(a) states,
When the trial court, in making an interlocutory order not otherwise appeala-
ble, finds that the order involves a question of law as to which there is substan-
tial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the
order may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, the
court shall so state in writing, identifying the question of law involved. Such a
statement may be made at the time of the entry of the order or thereafter on the
court's own motion or on motion of any party. The Appellate Court may there-
upon in its discretion allow an appeal from the order.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 1 10A, para. 308(a) (1989).
118. Gettov. City of Chicago, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1048, 416 N.E.2d 1110, 1112(1st
Dist. 1981) (citing People ex reL Mosley v. Carey, 74 Iln. 2d 527, 538, 387 N.E.2d 325,
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 940 (1979)).
119. See State ex reL Skinner v. Lombard Co., 106 Ill. App. 3d 307, 436 N.E.2d 566
(1st Dist. 1982).
120. People v. Pollution Control Bd., 129 Ill. App. 3d 958, 473 N.E.2d 452 (1st Dist.
1984) (a legislative enactment prohibitng the Board from regulating noise from sporting
events was constitutional). See Renshaw v. General Telephone Co., 112 Ill. App. 3d 58,
445 N.E.2d 70 (5th Dist. 1983) (discussing the structure of the Illinois Appellate Court).
It is interesting to note that the defendants in both Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41,
521 N.E.2d 932 (1988), and O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital, 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492
N.E.2d 1322 (1986) used Rule 308 to appeal denials of Rule 103(b) motions. See, e.g.,
infra notes 176, 155 and accompanying text.
121. Segal v. Sacco, 175 Ill. App. 3d 504, 506, 529 N.E.2d 1038, 1039 (1st Dist. 1988)
("Dismissal under Rule 103(b) is within the sound discretion of the trial court, and the
court's judgment will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion."); North Cicero
Dodge v. Victoria Feed Co., 151 Ill. App. 3d 860, 863, 503 N.E.2d 868, 870 (3d Dist.
1987) ("A dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 103(b) is within the sound discretion of
the trial court and will not be disturbed on review absent an abuse of that discretion.");
Kappel v. Errera, 164 Ill. App. 3d 673, 679, 518 N.E.2d 226, 231 (1st Dist. 1987) ("A
Rule 103(b) motion is directed to the sound discretion of the trial court. As such, a
court's determination will not be set aside on review absent a showing of an abuse of the
court's discretion."); Miller v. Alexander, 150 Ill. App. 3d 594, 595, 502 N.E.2d 40, 41
(2d Dist. 1986) ("Motions to dismiss for failure to exercise reasonable diligence to obtain
service of process are addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and absent
abuse of discretion, that court's ruling will not be disturbed."); Licka v. William A. Sales,
Ltd, 70 Ill. App. 3d 929, 937, 388 N.E.2d 1261, 1267 (1st Dist. 1979) ("A motion pursu-
ant to Rule 103(b) is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, and it is only
where there is an abuse of discretion that a reviewing court will interfere.").
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F. Miscellaneous: Affidavits, Special Appearances, and
Malpractice
1. Affidavits
Although Rule 103(b) does not state that affidavits are required
to show reasonable diligence, both plaintiffs and defendants have
consistently used affidavits to show reasonable diligence or a lack
thereof.122 In dicta courts have required affidavits to show reason-
able diligence.1 23 In Gatto v. Nelson,1 24 for example, the court
made two strong statements about the need for affidavits in show-
ing reasonable diligence. First, although the plaintiff's attorney
stated that his law clerk checked telephone directories to locate the
defendant, the court noted "that the motion to vacate [the dismis-
sal] did not include an affidavit from counsel's law clerk" attesting
to such investigation. 125 Secondly, although the plaintiff's attorney
stated that he hired a private investigator, who alleged the defend-
ant was in hiding, the court stated that, "plaintiff's counsel failed
to submit an affidavit from his investigator to authenticate these
averments."' 2 6 Thus, although not specifically required by Rule
103(b), some courts do require affidavits to support or confute alle-
gations of reasonable diligence.
2. Special Appearance
Despite defendants' practice of using special and limited appear-
ances,1 27 a special appearance is not required by defendants when
they file a Rule 103(b) motion because the motion itself asks the
court to exercise its jurisdiction over the matter. 128 Defendants,
however, have continued to use a special appearance instead of ap-
122. North Cicero Dodge, 151 Ill. App. 3d at 862, 503 N.E.2d at 869 ("plaintiff filed a
counter-affidavit in opposition to the defendant's [Rule 103(b)] motion"); Dawson v. St.
Francis Hosp., 174 111. App. 3d 351, 356, 528 N.E.2d 362, 365 (1st Dist. 1988) ("Defend-
ant... filed affidavits"); Montero v. University of Mll. Hosp., 57 IM. App. 3d 206, 211, 372
N.E.2d 1010, 1012 (1st Dist. 1978) ("record consists of two affidavits").
123. Jarmon v. Jinks, 165 Ill. App. 3d 855, 861, 520 N.E.2d 783, 786 (1st Dist. 1987)
("record lacks any sworn affidavits or other evidence").
124. 142 Ill. App. 3d 284, 492 N.E.2d 1 (1st Dist. 1986).
125. Id. at 288-89, 492 N.E.2d at 5.
126. Id. at 291, 492 N.E.2d at 7.
127. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-301 (1989).
128. Caliendo v. Public Taxi Serv., 70 Ill. App. 2d 86, 88, 217 N.E.2d 369, 371 (1st
Dist. 1966) ("The defendant ... invoked the court's jurisdiction by asking it to exercise
its power to dismiss an action..."); see also Lovell v. Hastings, 11 IlM. App. 3d 221, 223,
296 N.E.2d 608, 610 (5th Dist. 1973) ("Dismissal for lack of diligence under Supreme
Court Rule 103(b) does not require that defendant proceed by way of a special
appearance.").
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pearing generally,1 29 apparently believing that a Rule 103(b) gen-
eral appearance will somehow prejudice their defense. This
practice is unnecessary when filing a Rule 103(b) motion.
3. Legal Malpractice
The fifth district has recently decided that failure to use reason-
able diligence to obtain service of process is a negligent act on the
part of the plaintiff's attorney. 30 Although it is too early to pre-
dict the consequences of this decision, it seems very possible that
any case in which a Rule 103(b) motion precludes a plaintiff from a
cause of action because the service was obtained after the expira-
tion of the statute of limitations could evolve instantly into a new
case of legal malpractice against the plaintiff's attorney. Further-
more, once the plaintiff's case is dismissed pursuant to Rule
103(b), the attorney would be liable per se on the question of negli-
gence. '3' The attorney, however, would not be liable per se on the
issue of damages or causation. 32
III. INTERPLAY OF SUPREME COURT RULE 103(B) AND
ILLINOIS CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE SECTIONS 2-
1009 AND 13-217
Although standing alone Rule 103(b) has had a problematic his-
tory of application, greater difficulties arise when Rule 103(b) con-
flicts with the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure sections 2- 1009133
129. Daily v. Hartley, 77 Ill. App. 3d 697, 700, 396 N.E.2d 586, 589 (3d Dist. 1979)
(defendant "filed a special and limited appearance and a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's
complaint pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 103(b). . ."); Galvan v. Morales, 9 InI. App.
3d 255, 256, 292 N.E.2d 36, 37 (1st Dist. 1972) (defendants "filed a special and limited
appearance... and one week later filed their motion to dismiss for lack of diligence.").
130. Gray v. Hallett, 170 Ill. App. 3d 660, 525 N.E.2d 89 (5th Dist. 1988) (holding
that service of process does not require legal judgment and therefore no expert testimony
is needed).
131. Id. at 664, 525 N.E.2d at 92 ("delaying for so long that a dismissal for lack of
diligence becomes a permanent bar by virtue of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 103(b) [cita-
tion omitted] is clearly and unquestionably negligent.").
132. See Weiland, Another Early Chapter: Attorney Malpractice and the Trial Within
a Trial: Time for a Change, 19 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 275 (1986). See generally Moor-
man Mfg. Co. v. National Tank Co., 91111. 2d 69, 435 N.E.2d 443 (1982) (economic loss
is generally not recoverable for a tort).
133. Section 2-1009 provides:
(a) The plaintiff may, at any time before trial or hearing begins, upon notice to
each party who has appeared or each such party's attorney, and upon payment
of costs, dismiss his or her action or any part thereof as to any defendant, with-
out prejudice, by order filed in the cause. Thereafter, the plaintiff may dismiss,
only on terms fixed by the court (t) upon filing a stipulation to that effect signed
by the defendant, or (2) on motion specifying the ground for dismissal, which
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and 13-217.134 Recently, the relationship between Rule 103(b) and
these sections has been the focus of recurrent review in the
Supreme Court of Illinois. In several cases, the court has at-
tempted to reconcile the interplay between Rule 103(b) and sec-
tions 2-1009 and 13-217. These cases generally do not involve
questions pertaining to the substantive application of the Rule;1 35
rather, the issue in these cases more accurately involves whether
plaintiffs confronted with a Rule 103(b) motion can dismiss their
claims voluntarily under section 2-1009 and then reffle the claims
pursuant to section 13-217. This practice allows the plaintiff to
avoid dismissal for a lack of reasonable diligence. The Supreme
Court of Illinois first explained the relationship between Rule
103(b) and section 2-1009 and 13-217 in O'Connell v. St. Francis
Hospital.1 36 Subsequent cases have attempted to clarify this initial
explanation. 137
A. Pre-O'Connell-Aranda v. Hobart Manufacturing Corp.
In Aranda v. Hobart Manufacturing Corp.,138 the court reversed
the trial court's dismissal for lack of reasonable diligence.1 39 In
Aranda, the trial court dismissed the plaintiff's case for want of
shall be supported by affidavit or other proof. After a counterclaim has been
pleaded by a defendant no dismissal may be had as to the defendant except by
the defendant's consent. (b) Counter-claimants and third party plaintiffs may
dismiss upon the same terms and conditions as plaintiffs.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1009 (1989).
134. Section 13-217 provides:
In actions specified in Article XIII of this Act or any other act or contract
where the time for commencing an action is limited, if... the action is volunta-
rily dismissed by the plaintiff... then, whether or not the time limitation for
bringing such action expires during the pendency of such action, the plaintiff
... may commence a new action within one year or within the remaining period
of limitation, whichever is greater, . . after the action is voluntarily dismissed
by the plaintiff.
Id. para. 13-217.
135. See Martinez v. Erickson, 127 Ill. 2d 112, 113, 535 N.E.2d 853, 854 (1989) ("In
neither case had the plaintiff attempted or obtained service of process on any of the de-
fendants."); Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41, 43, 521 N.E.2d 932, 933 (1988) ("The
suit remained pending for two years, during which time plaintiff neither attempted nor
obtained service of process upon any of the defendants."); Catlett v. Novak, 116 Ill. 2d
63, 65-66, 506 N.E.2d 586, 587-588 (1987) ("[The defendant] filed a motion ... to dismiss
... under Rule 103(b)[,] arguing that he was not served until nearly one year after the
statute of limitations had run and until almost three years after the accident occurred.
The plaintiff, in response, moved for a voluntary dismissal.").
136. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
137. See infra notes 164-190 and accompanying text.
138. 66 Ill. 2d 616, 363 N.E.2d 796 (1977).
139. Id. at 620, 363 N.E.2d at 799.
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prosecution before the applicable statute of limitations had run. ,40
No defendants had been served in that action. After the statute of
limitations ran, the plaintiff refiled her action pursuant to section
24a,' 4' now section 13-217.42 All the defendants were served
within a month. Because of the length of time between the filing of
the first suit and the service of the summons in the second suit, the
trial court held that the plaintiff lacked reasonable diligence and
granted the defendant's Rule 103(b) motion. The appellate court
affirmed. 143
In reversing the appellate court's decision, the supreme court
noted that because the case was dismissed prior to the passage of
the statute of limitations, the dismissal could only be without prej-
udice.'" The court then stated that the statute "operates ... as an
extension of the applicable statute of limitations, and the plaintiff
had an absolute right to refile his complaint at any time within the
extended period."' 4 The court warned, "If the extended period of
time of [section 13-217] is to serve any useful purpose, plaintiff
must be accorded a reasonable time after refiling his complaint
within which to obtain service."' 46 Although the court allowed
trial courts to consider the overall time span between the first com-
plaint and the ultimate service of process, the court stated, "[T]he
period of time within which the plaintiff must obtain service fol-
lowing the refiling of his suit . . .cannot be so abbreviated as to
make the right granted by that section meaningless."''4 7 Thus, the
Aranda court read section 13-217 and section 2-1009 liberally to
prevent dismissal of the plaintiff's suit pursuant to a 103(b) mo-
tion, if the original dismissal was without prejudice.
B. O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital
In 1986, the Supreme Court of Illinois decided O'Connell v. St.
Francis Hospital,' thereby spawning a line of cases testing not
only the relationship between Rule 103(b) and sections 2-1009 and
13-217, but also a plaintiff's right to dismiss voluntarily in gen-
eral. 4 9 Without reference to Aranda, the O'Connell court held
140. Id. at 617, 363 N.E.2d at 797.
141. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 83, para. 24(a) (1973).
142. Aranda, 66 Il. 2d at 617, 363 N.E.2d at 797.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 619, 363 N.E.2d at 798.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 620, 363 N.E.2d at 799.
148. 112 Ill. 2d 273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986).
149. See Goldberg v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 160 Il. App. 3d 867, 513 N.E.2d 919
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that a Rule 103(b) motion, if made first, must be heard on its mer-
its prior to a plaintiff's motion to dismiss under section 2-1009.15°
In O'Connell, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's
claim pursuant to Rule 103(b).15" In response, the plaintiff moved
for a voluntary dismissal under section 2-1009.1 2 The trial court
granted the plaintiff's voluntary dismissal and the plaintiff then re-
filed pursuant to section 13-217.153 The defendants were then
promptly served. The defendants again moved for dismissal for
failure to use reasonable diligence in serving process in the original
complaint.1 54 The trial court denied the motion but certified the
question pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 308."55 On appeal, the
plaintiff argued to the Supreme Court of Illinois that Rule 103(b)
was applicable only to the service of process on the reified com-
plaint, and not the original complaint.I5 6
Relying on a separation of powers argument, the court held that
when a procedural legislative enactment and a court rule conflict,
the rule will prevail because the court possesses constitutional au-
thority to regulate the judicial system. 5 7 The court stated, "Rule
103(b) was adopted by this court to effectuate its historical and
constitutional mandate to render justice fairly and promptly.""5 "
Because sections 2-1009 and 13-217 infringe on the court's funda-
mental authority to discharge its duties fairly and expeditiously, if
made first, a Rule 103(b) motion must be heard on its merits prior
to a motion for voluntary dismissal. In addressing the merits of
the Rule 103(b) motion, the trial court may consider the circum-
(1st Dist. 1987); Highland v. Stevenson, 153 Ill. App. 3d 390, 505 N.E.2d 776 (3d Dist.
1987); Jacobson v. Ragsdale, 160 Ill. App. 3d 656, 513 N.E.2d 1112 (5th Dist. 1987);
Rohr v. Kraus, 153 Ill. App. 3d 1013, 506 N.E.2d 634 (5th Dist. 1987); Mancuso v. Alda
Blanch Beach, 149 Ill. App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589 (1st Dist. 1986) (attempting to
extend the rule to motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim); Metcalfe v. St. Elizabeth
Hosp., 160 Ill. App. 3d 47, 513 N.E.2d 12 (5th Dist. 1986) (attempting to extend the rule
to motions to dismiss based on an affirmative defense); Russ v. Grady, 149 Ill. App. 3d
660, 500 N.E.2d 1032 (5th Dist. 1986) (attempting to extend the rule to motions for
summary judgment).
150. O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 112 Ill. 2d 273, 283, 492 N.E.2d 1322, 1327
(1986).
151. Id. at 276-77, 492 N.E.2d at 1323.
152. Id. at 277, 492 N.E.2d at 1323.
153. Id. at 277, 492 N.E.2d at 1323-24.
154. Id. at 278, 492 N.E.2d at 1324.
155. Id at 277, 492 N.E.2d at 1324 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. I10A, para. 308
(1983)).
156. Id. at 279, 492 N.E.2d at 1324-25. The plaintiff was probably relying on Aranda
as a basis for this argument; however, the O'Connell court never addressed Aranda.
157. Id. at 281, 492 N.E.2d at 1326.
158. Id.
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stances surrounding the service of process on the plaintiff's origi-
nal as well as refiled complaint. 5 9 The O'Connell court thus
sharply limited the use of sections 2-1009 and 13-217 to avoid a
Rule 103(b) motion.
The O'Connell decision not only reversed several appellate court
decisions,16° it also caused an avalanche of cases seeking to extend
its holding to other dispositive motions. 61 The courts continually
refused the attempts to extend the O'Connell holding to other mo-
tions. The supreme court, however, eventually extended an
O'Connell-type rule in Gibellina v. Handley.'62 In Gibellina, the
court held that a trial court may hear and decide a motion that has
been filed prior to a section 2-1009 motion when that motion, if
favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a final disposition
of the case. 16 3
C. Catlett v. Novak
A year after O'Connell was decided, the Illinois Supreme Court
reaffirmed it in Catlett v. Novak.'" In Catlett, the plaintiff filed a
complaint against Novak and the Illinois Central Gulf Railroad
("ICG").6 5 Novak was not served until nearly a year after the
statute of limitations had run and three years after the cause of
action arose. 66 ICG was never served on the original complaint.
Novak moved for dismissal pursuant to Rule 103(b) and the plain-
tiff moved to dismiss voluntarily. The trial court granted the plain-
159. Id. at 283, 492 N.E.2d at 1327.
160. See Miller v. Alexander, 150 Ill. App. 3d 594, 595, 502 N.E.2d 40, 41 (2d Dist.
1986) ("In light of the decision in O'Connell, Kiven v. Mercedes-Benz... Land v. Green-
wood... and LaBarge, Inc. v. Corn Belt Bank... are no longer good law." (citations
omitted)); see Kiven v. Mercedes-Benz of North Amercia Inc., 142 I11. App. 3d 245, 247,
488 N.E.2d 559, 560 (1st Dist. 1985), reversed, 111 Ill. 2d 585, 491 N.E.2d 1167 (1986)
(holding that a Rule 103(b) motion does not constitute a hearing under the voluntary
dismissal statute); Land v. Greenwood, 133 I11. App. 3d 537, 478 N.E.2d 1203 (4th Dist.
1985) (holding that a plaintiff may voluntarily dismiss a suit and refile within one year if
done prior to trial or hearing, notwithstanding the running of the statute of limitations or
the plaintiff's lack of diligence in obtaining service); LaBarge, Inc. v. Corn Belt Bank, 101
Ill. App. 3d 741, 428 N.E.2d 711 (4th Dist. 1981) (holding that a plaintiff could volunta-
rily dismiss after the defendant filed a 103(b) motion as long as the original action was
filed within the statute of limitations). See also O'Connor v. Ohio Centennial Corp., 124
Ill. App. 3d 281, 463 N.E.2d 1376 (3d Dist. 1984) (dismissal with prejudice for want of
prosecution reversed because the plaintiff had an absolute right to refile under section 13-
217).
161. See supra note 149.
162. 127 Ill. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
163. Id. at 137-38, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
164. 116 Ill. 2d 63, 506 N.E.2d 586 (1987).
165. Id. at 65, 506 N.E.2d at 587.
166. Id.
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tiff's motion. The plaintiff then refiled his complaint nine months
later. Both defendants then filed motions to dismiss, claiming that
section 13-217 was an unconstitutional violation of their due pro-
cess rights to rely on the statute of limitations.1 67 The trial court
granted ICG's motion. 68
The supreme court applied O'Connell and held "that a plaintiff's
right to voluntarily dismiss and refie his complaint under sections
2-1009 and 13-217 are subject to the reasonable diligence standard
of Rule 103(b)."' 69 The court then remanded the cause to the trial
court for a hearing on the question of reasonable diligence in serv-
ing process. 7° Reiterating the O'Connell holding, the court in-
structed that "the trial court 'may consider the circumstances
surrounding plaintiff's service of process on his original as well as
his refiled complaint.' ' 7  The supreme court had decided
O'Connell while the Catlett suit was before the lower courts; thus,
in effect, the Catlett court applied O'Connell retroactively.
D. Muskat v. Sternberg
In Muskat v. Sternberg, 72 the Illinois Supreme Court explicitly
approved the retroactive application of O'Connell. 73 In Muskat,
one day before the expiration of the applicable statute of limita-
tions, the plaintiff filed suit against a surgeon, hospital, and manu-
facturer alleging negligence and product liability. 74 For two years,
the plaintiff neither attempted nor obtained service of process upon
the defendant, and the action was dismissed for want of prosecu-
tion. The plaintiff later refiled her complaint, and the defendants
moved to dismiss under Rule 103(b). The trial court denied the
motion, holding that the time from the refiling the lawsuit to the
service of summons was the proper period by which to measure the
plaintiff's diligence. On appeal, the appellate court reversed and
remanded. '71
In affirming the appellate court, the supreme court reiterated the
O'Connell holding that the trial court may consider the circum-
167. Id. at 66, 506 N.E.2d at 588.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 70, 506 N.E.2d at 590.
170. Id. at 70-71, 506 N.E.2d at 590.
171. Id. at 71, 506 N.E.2d at 590 (quoting O'Connell v. St. Francis Hosp., 112 Ill. 2d
273, 492 N.E.2d 1322 (1986)).
172. 122 Ill. 2d 41, 521 N.E.2d 932 (1988).
173. Id. at 50, 521 N.E.2d at 936.
174. Id. at 43, 521 N.E.2d at 933.
175. Id.
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stances surrounding the plaintiff's service of process not only on
the original but also on the refiled complaint. 7 6 Additionaly, the
court addressed whether O'Connell should be applied retroactively.
The court gave three reasons to justify retroactive application of
O'Connell.17 First, "the holding of O'Connell related to proce-
dural, and not substantive, matters."'' 78 Second, the court did "not
view the holding in O'Connell as a clear change in the law"'' 7 be-
cause the holding in Aranda v Hobart Manufacturing Corp., al-
lowing the trial court to consider the overall span of time between
the filing of the complaint and the ultimate service of process in the
refiled suit, foreshadowed O'Connell.80 Third, the court noted
that it previously had applied O'Connell retroactively in Catlett.'s'
E. Martinez v. Erickson
The Supreme Court of Illinois again questioned the retroactive
application of O'Connell in Martinez v. Erickson.82 In Martinez,
on the same day the statute of limitations expired, the plaintiff
brought an action in the Cook County Circuit Court, alleging med-
ical malpractice against Dr. John Erickson, Dr. Darroll Erickson,
and the Sterling-Rock Falls Clinic ("Clinic").8 3  About five
months later, one day before the statute of limitations expired, the
plaintiff brought a factually related action, in the same circuit
court, against Dr. Bakkiam Subbiah. The plaintiff dismissed his
action voluntarily against the Ericksons and the Clinic, and the
action against Dr. Subbiah was dismissed for want of prosecution.
The plaintiff neither attempted nor obtained service of process on
any of the defendants in either case. 8 4
Pursuant to section 13-217, the plaintiff refiled a single action in
the Circuit Court of Whiteside County against all the defendants.
Although served within three weeks, all defendants eventually
moved for dismissal under Rule 103(b). Eventually, the trial court
granted Dr. Erickson's and the Clinic's motion for summary judg-
176. Id. at 45, 521 N.E.2d at 934.
177. Id. at 49-50, 521 N.E.2d at 936.
178. Id. at 49, 521 N.E.2d at 936.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 50, 521 N.E.2d at 936 (citing Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Corp., 66 Ill. 2d 616,
363 N.E.2d 796 (1977)).
181. Id. For a further discussion and critique of these three factors see infra notes
191-212 and accompanying text.
182. 127 Il. 2d 112, 535 N.E.2d 853 (1989).
183. Id. at 113, 535 N.E.2d at 854.
184. Id. at 113-14, 535 N.E.2d at 854.
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ment and Dr. Subbiah's motion to dismiss."'5
The appellate court reversed, ruling that O'Connell established a
new principle of law that should not be applied retroactively.8 6
The appellate court concluded that Catlett was not controlling be-
cause it did not examine the fact that O'Connell represented a clear
change in the law, nor did it mention the issue of the new rule's
retroactive application.18 7
The supreme court reversed, declaring that retroactive applica-
tion of O'Connell was expressly resolved in Muskat v. Sternberg. s18
After reiterating the three reasons for retroactive application,8 9
the court went on to state, "[w]e are concerned... that the circuit
court judge may not have accorded adequate weight to the plain-
tiff's conduct in effecting service on the defendants following the
refiling of his action in Whiteside County,"'1'1 and remanded the
case. Thus, Martinez solidified the court's previous decisions re-
garding retroactive application of O'Connell.
IV. THE IMPROPRIETY OF APPLYING O'CONNELL
RETROACTIVELY
Although Muskat and Martinez explicitly set forth that the
O'Connell rule should be applied retroactively, 19' the court's justifi-
cation for doing so is not persuasive. O'Connell should not have
been applied retroactively for three reasons: first, the court's argu-
ments fail to support retroactive application; second, the compan-
ion case to Martinez, Gibellina v. Handley, 92 holding that a trial
court may hear a dispositive motion filed prior to a motion to vol-
untarily dismiss, was applied prospectively only; third, the stan-
dards for determining application of a new rule favor prospective
application.
185. Id. at 114, 535 N.E.2d at 854.
186. Id. at 115, 535 N.E.2d at 855.
187. Id. The appellate court's decision appears at 155 Ill. App. 3d 1093, 509 N.E.2d
1032 (3d Dist. 1987). The appellate court applied the three-part test of Board of
Comm'rs of Wood Dale Public Library Dist. v. County of DuPage, 103 Ill. 2d 422, 469
N.E.2d 1370 (1984) to determine if a decision should be applied prospectively or retroac-
tively. The test's elements are as follows: 1) whether the decision announces a new prin-
ciple of law; 2) whether the purposes and effects will be best served by prospective or
retroactive application; and 3) whether it would be inequitable to impose retroactive
application.
188. Martinez, 127 Ill. 2d at 117, 535 N.E.2d at 856.
189. See supra notes 177-181 and accompanying text.
190. Martinez, 127 Ill. 2d at 121, 535 N.E.2d at 857.
191. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81.
192. 127 Ill. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
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The court's arguments in support of the retroactive application
of O'Connell are unpersuasive. The court asserted that retroactive
application was possible because: 1) the change was procedural; 2)
it was not a clear change in the law; and 3) it had been applied
retroactively already. 193 The court is disingenuous, however, in as-
serting that these three reasons clearly support retroactive applica-
tion of O'Connell. These three reasons are not as persuasive as the
court suggests. Although the Illinois Supreme Court Rules are
procedural, 194 a dismissal with prejudice bars any consideration of
the substantive merit of the claim. Thus, in allowing consideration
of a Rule 103(b) motion before consideration of the motion to dis-
miss voluntarily, the O'Connell holding exalts procedure over sub-
stance. The court in O'Connell stated "Nothing is more critical to
the judicial function than the administration of justice without de-
lay."' 195 That function must be balanced, however, with the "over-
riding consideration that cases should be decided on their merits
after both sides have their day in court."' 196
In addition, O'Connell marked a clear change in the law as the
confusion regarding its application illustrates, i.e., within three
years, three cases directly questioning the holding reached the Illi-
nois Supreme Court. Furthermore, as the Miller v. Alexander
court noted, 197 O'Connell overruled several appellate court deci-
sions. These appellate courts relied on the court's decision in
Aranda,19s and they apparently did not view Aranda as a precursor
to the O'Connell decision.
Contrary to the court's assertions, Aranda arguably did not fore-
shadow O'Connell; the court in O'Connell made no reference or
cite to Aranda. Certainly one would expect a case that foreshad-
ows a holding, on a very important point, to be mentioned. Courts
considering both cases have consistently distinguished O'Connell
from Aranda and have stated that Aranda stands for an entirely
different proposition than does O'Connell.199 In fact, in Muskat,
193. These three justifications for the retroactive application of a judicial decision
were first identified in Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41, 49-50, 521 N.E.2d 932, 936
(1988). Martinez merely reiterated them without further analysis. Martinez, 127 Ill. 2d
at 121, 535 N.E.2d at 857.
194. O'Connell, 112 Ill. 2d at 281, 492 N.E.2d at 1326 ("The Illinois Constitution
clearly empowers this court to promulgate procedural rules..." (emphasis added)).
195. Id. at 282, 492 N.E.2d at 1326 (1986).
196. Galvan v. Morales, 9 Ill. App. 3d 255, 258, 292 N.E.2d 36, 38 (1st Dist. 1972).
197. See supra note 160 for a list of cases overruled by the O'Connell decision.
198. See supra notes 138-47 and accompanying text.
199. Muskat v. Sternberg, 122 Ill. 2d 41; 45, 521 N.E.2d 932, 934 (1988) ("We noted
in Aranda that the dismissal had been before the running of the statute of limitations and
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wherein the court characterized the O'Connell holding as consis-
tent with prior law, the court distinguished Aranda. The Muskat
court said that Aranda involved dismissal before the statute of limi-
tations expired, whereas O'Connell involved a dismissal after the
expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. 2°° The Muskat
court thus distinguished Aranda from O'Connell while simultane-
ously asserting that Aranda foreshadowed O'Connell. Such rea-
soning is patently illogical.
Finally, although the court had previously applied O'Connell
retroactively in Catlett, the court did not do so explicitly. Given
the many cases surrounding this question of law, if the court had
applied O'Connell retroactively in Catlett, it would have done so
explicitly. It is more likely that the court did not address the issue
of O'Connell's retroactive application because it was not raised.
The Muskat court inferred from this silence a directive to apply
O'Connell retroactively. Unfortunately, the court acted in a less
than forthright manner by basing a significant change in the law
upon a silence created by its own refusal to address an issue not
raised, and by later declaring that the meaning of the silence was
obvious.
A second argument for the non-retroactive application of
O'Connell derives from Gibellina v. Handley,2 °1 the companion
case to Martinez v. Erickson. 2 2 In Gibellina,20 a the Supreme Court
of Illinois held that a trial court may hear and decide a dispositive
motion which has been filed before a section 2-1009 motion, when
that motion, if favorably ruled on by the court, could result in a
final disposition of the case.2° 4 The Gibellina court's holding was
given prospective application only.20 5 The court stated:
Unlike Martinez v. Erickson, . . . also filed today, which upheld
the retroactivity of O'Connell v. St. Francis Hospital ... the cases
in this appeal did not involve an unequivocal conflict between a
specific rule of this court and the Code. Under the O'Connell line
of cases, it cannot be disputed that plaintiffs had already been put
on notice of the necessity of notifying potential defendants of the
impending suit. Application of O'Connell retroactively therefore
that if the dismissal would have been under our Rule 103(b) for failure to exercise dili-
gence in obtaining service, the case could only have been dismissed without prejudice.").
200. Id
201. 127 IIl. 2d 122, 535 N.E.2d 858 (1989).
202. 127 Ill. 2d 112, 535 N.E.2d 853 (1989).
203. Gibellina, 127 Ill. 2d at 137-38, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
204. Id. at 138, 535 N.E.2d at 866.
205. Id.
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cannot be construed as an unfair burden on the litigants.2 "s
Instead of comparing the similarity between Gibellina and the
initial holding in O'Connell, the court compares Gibellina to the
entire "O'Connell line of cases." 207 By relying on the entire line of
cases, the court bypasses the important comparison between the
actual holdings in Gibellina and O'Connell. Because both cases
marked a clear change in the law, their holdings and effects are
more similar than dissimilar.208 Thus, like Gibellina, O'Connell
should have been held to apply prospectively only.
The rules of prospective or retroactive application also favor a
prospective application of O'Connell. In a civil case the general
rule requires consideration of the following criteria: "(1) a decision
to be applied prospectively must establish a new principle of law;
(2) will the purpose and effect of the new decision be best served by
retroactive or prospective application? and (3) the equities of the
situation." 2°9 A more specific standard states that, "[g]enerally,
decisions are applied retroactively unless the court: (1) expressly
states its decision is a clear break with its past decisions; (2) over-
rules its own past practice; (3) disapproves a prior practice it has
previously approved; or (4) overturns a well-established body of
lower court precedent. '210
Under either the first general rule or the more specific standard,
O'Connell should have been applied prospectively only. O'Connell
requires a prospective application because it instituted a new prin-
ciple of law. O'Connell was the only Illinois Supreme Court deci-
sion to address the specific issue of the effect of a Rule 103(b)
motion on a case voluntarily dismissed after the statute of limita-
206. Ia1
207. Id.
208. Gibellina effectively reversed many cases including the following: Goldberg v.
Swedish Covenant Hosp., 160 Ill. App. 3d 867, 513 N.E.2d 919 (1st Dist. 1987); Jacobson
v. Ragsdale, 160 Ill. App. 3d 656, 513 N.E.2d 1112 (5th Dist. 1987); Griffen v. Area E-7
Hospital Ass'n, 158 Ill. App. 3d 720, 511 N.E.2d 256 (4th Dist. 1987); Highland v. Ste-
venson, 153 Ill. App. 3d 390, 505 N.E.2d 776 (3d Dist. 1987); Rohr v. Kraus, 153 Ill.
App. 3d 1013, 506 N.E.2d 634 (5th Dist. 1987); Mancuso v. Alda Blanch Beach, 149 Ill.
App. 3d 188, 500 N.E.2d 589 (1st Dist. 1986); Metcalfe v. St. Elizabeth Hosp., 160 Ill.
App. 3d 47, 513 N.E.2d 12 (5th Dist. 1986); Russ v. Grady, 149 Ill. App. 3d 660, 500
N.E.2d 1032 (5th Dist. 1986). See also supra note 160 (cases overruled by O'Connell).
209. Revoal v. Illinois Human Rights Comm'n, 128 Ill. App. 3d 70, 74, 470 N.E.2d
54, 57 (1st Dist. 1984) (employee was entitled to a hearing before the Human Rights
Commission on the merits of his charge under the retroactive application of the United
States Supreme Court holding that access to a Human Rights Commission adjudicative
process was a protected property interest under the 14th Amendment).
210. Board of Educ. v. Illinois Educ. Labor Relations Bd., 183 Ill. App. 3d 972, 977,
539 N.E.2d 882, 885 (4th Dist. 1989) (retrospective application of a decision rejecting the
IELRB's authority to reconsider its own orders).
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tions has expired. 2 11 The court cited no authority for the specific
holding. That O'Connell was a new principle of law is also shown
by the number of cases overruled by its decision.21 2 Thus, contrary
to the court's assertions, O'Connell marked a significant departure
from existing law and should have been given prospective applica-
tion only.
V. CONCLUSION
While the standard for Rule 103(b)-reasonable diligence mea-
sured by the totality of the circumstances-has had questionable
applications in the past, the Rule's relationship with sections 2-
1009 and 13-217 is the most vexing problem for the courts. When
both the questionable application and relationship with 2-1009 and
13-217 collide in a single case, the courts, and undoubtedly the
Supreme Court of Illinois, will need to reevaluate the Rule, its ap-
plication, and its interplay with the Code of Civil Procedure in or-
der to provide litigants with a more comprehensive understanding
of these various rules. Clarification of the present application and
use of Rule 103(b) will also help future courts determine whether
amendments to the current rules of application should be given
retroactive or prospective application.
211. Aranda addressed only the narrow issue of whether the dismissal could be with
prejudice if the defendant was served prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Aranda v. Hobart Mfg. Co., 66 Il1. 2d 616, 619, 363 N.E.2d 796, 798 (1977).
212. See supra note 160.
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